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Vertical restraints and horizontal control 
Robert Innes∗ 
and 
Stephen F. Hamilton∗∗ 
This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more 
than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the ﬁrm to 
acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts 
produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting 
fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation 
with below-cost manufacturer pricing for the dominant brand(s). Applications are developed for 
supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand seeks to control the retail 
pricing of a supermarket’s private label, and for convenience stores, where a gasoline provider 
seeks to control the retail pricing of an in-store composite consumption good. 
1. Introduction 
� Vertical restraints by manufacturers on the retailers of their products continue to be a source 
of legal and policy debate. Indeed, in June of 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed course on the 
legal treatment of resale price maintenance (RPM), overturning its earlier decision on the per se 
illegality of the practice in favor of a reasoned approach.1 This ruling is in line with the traditional 
explanation for vertical restraints that the practice serves to align private incentives between 
manufacturers and retailers in the sale of manufactured goods. Absent restraint, intensive price 
competition among retailers can lead to an inadequate level of pre-sale retail services (Telser, 
1960; Mathewson and Winter, 1984; Marvel and McCafferty, 1984; Rey and Tirole, 1986; Klein 
and Murphy, 1988; Winter, 1993) or promote excessive post-sale quality differentiation (Bolton 
and Bonanno, 1988). Vertical restraints can correct these distortions. Doing so generally produces 
efﬁciency beneﬁts, a point that has been argued by many economists following Bork (1966) and 
Posner (1976).2 
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1 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) and Leegin Creative Leather Products, 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. Slip Op. no. 06–480 (decided June 28, 2007). 
2 There are two main counterpoints to the pro-competitive view. Under uncertainty, conﬂicts can arise when a 
manufacturer must balance private incentives in supply with the need to provide insurance to retailers (Rey and Tirole, 
This article considers vertical restraints in a multi-product retail environment. In this setting, 
we identify more pernicious effects: a vertical restraint on a manufacturer’s own good serves as 
a mechanism to control the retail pricing of another (“rival”) manufactured good. 
We consider a successive oligopoly market structure with two manufacturing industries, 
two retailers, and two goods. In the upstream market, one good is produced by a monopolist 
(or differentiated-product duopolists) and the second good is produced by a competitive fringe. 
In the downstream market, the two goods are bundled together in the sense that each retailer 
carries both goods and each consumer buys both goods from one of the two retailers. Examples 
of such a vertical structure include supermarkets that carry both a national brand and a store 
brand (private label), convenience stores that sell gasoline and in-store consumption goods, 
and computer retailers that bundle essential components (such as processors and operating 
systems) with a set of commoditized components (such as DRAM, hard drives, and ﬂat-panel 
displays). 
Our analysis builds on several recent papers. Winter (1993) considers a single manufacturer 
that imposes vertical restraints on duopoly retailers to elicit the optimal mix of priced and 
non-priced retail services. Absent contracts, the retailers compete excessively in prices and fail 
to provide a sufﬁcient level of service; RPM combined with a wholesale price elevated above 
marginal cost simultaneously corrects both distortions. Rey and Verge´ (2004) consider how RPM 
can be used by duopoly manufacturers to control the retail pricing of duopoly retailers. The 
manufacturers’ use of vertical restraints frees their wholesale prices to be set at marginal cost, 
and this circumvents retail-manufacturer contract externalities that would otherwise result in 
disadvantageous price competition.3 
In the present setting, vertical restraints likewise serve to resolve retail market externalities; 
however, the essential difference is our focus on the joint pricing decisions of multi-product 
retailers who sell both a dominant manufacturer’s good and a product produced by a competitive 
fringe. In this regard, our arguments are related to the substantial literature on the extension of 
monopoly power to other products through the use of tying arrangements (e.g., Whinston, 1990; 
Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidmann, 1990; Shaffer, 1991b) or commodity bundling (e.g., Nalebuff, 
2004; Mathewson and Winter, 1997; DeGraba and Mohammed, 1999; McAfee, McMillan, and 
Whinston, 1989). Innes and Hamilton (2006), for example, show how a dominant ﬁrm can 
use explicit cross-market controls on retailers’ contracts to achieve an integrated multi-good 
monopoly outcome; the monopoly manufacturer dictates that suppliers of the rival good pay 
lump-sum transfers that serve to elevate the good’s wholesale price and thereby prompt retailers to 
charge monopoly prices. In practice, such explicit cross-market controls are likely to be infeasible, 
whether due to proscriptions of antitrust law or due to an inherent inability of the monopolist 
to observe and verify retailers’ cross-market conduct. Here we focus on how a vertical restraint 
imposed on a manufacturer’s own product can be used to extract rents from the market for another 
product, without stipulating any cross-market tying, bundling, pricing, or contract terms. 
Vertical contracts that extract cross-market rents produce several notable symptoms. 
Irrespective of the relationship between the products in utility (complements, substitutes, or 
independent goods), vertical restraints on the monopolist’s product induce retailers to sign 
contracts with suppliers in the competitive fringe that involve ﬁxed fees paid to the retailer 
(“slotting allowances”). Slotting allowances are prevalent in practice (Federal Trade Commission, 
2003), and highly controversial. We show that their effects are often anti-competitive in a multi­
product context. 
For weakly substitutable, independent, or weakly complementary goods, vertical restraints 
result in negative retail margins on the dominant manufactured good. Hence, our analysis offers a 
1986). Under oligopoly, vertical restraints can be used by retailers in their contracts with manufacturers to dampen 
downstream competition (Shaffer, 1991a). For an excellent review, see Mathewson and Winter (1998). 
3 See also Marx and Shaffer (2004) and Rey, Thal, and Verge´ (2006), who study the structure of vertical contracts 
between a single manufacturer and differentiated duopoly retailers of the manufacturer’s product. 
new explanation for loss-leader retail pricing that does not rely on coordination failures (Bagwell 
and Ramey, 1994), imperfect information (Lal and Matutes, 1994), heterogeneous consumers 
(DeGraba, 2006), or product complementarities in multi-product monopoly markets (Bliss, 1988). 
For strongly substitutable goods, the dominant manufacturer selects a wholesale price below 
marginal cost, producing a type of “predatory accommodation” similar to that derived by Marx 
and Shaffer (1999), albeit for different reasons. 
In Marx and Shaffer (1999), below-cost wholesale prices arise because a monopoly retailer 
can thereby extract rents from competing suppliers. In our setting, a dominant manufacturer 
distorts her wholesale price from marginal cost to counter the retailers’ incentive to discount the 
rival retail good. For independent goods, a dominant manufacturer sets a wholesale price above the 
(maintained) retail price to decrease retailers’ per-customer rents. Retailer losses on the dominant 
good, in turn, temper interretailer incentives to attract customers from rivals by discounting the 
price of the competitively supplied good. For substitute goods, raising the wholesale price above 
marginal cost has two effects on the retailers’ pricing incentives. Narrowing the retailers’ margin 
on the dominant good under the restraint decreases the return to attracting customers (favoring a 
higher retail price for the rival good), but also reduces the opportunity cost of shifting consumption 
from the dominant good to the competitively supplied substitute good (favoring a lower retail 
price for the rival good). With strong substitutes, the second effect dominates and a below-cost 
wholesale price by the dominant manufacturer is needed to prompt the retailers to raise the retail 
price of the rival good. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Sections 2–5, we frame our analysis 
around duopoly retailers who each sell a monopoly-produced good and a second, competitively 
supplied good. Section 2 develops the model and Section 3 compares the collective optimum 
that maximizes joint manufacturer-retailer proﬁts to the outcome without vertical restraints. 
In Sections 4 and 5, we consider how vertical restraints can reconcile these outcomes in an 
environment without and with retailer-fringe contracts, respectively. We develop applications to 
gasoline stations/convenience stores and supermarket retailing, and derive some implications for 
antitrust policy. 
In Section 6, we consider retail formats without product bundling and extend our observations 
to oligopoly settings in which multiple manufacturers impose vertical restraints on retailers. Under 
oligopoly, each manufacturer ignores the proﬁts of rival manufacturers when selecting a target 
retail price and, as a result, incentives for predatory accommodation are particularly harmful. 
Indeed, in the case of highly substitutable goods, vertical restraints lead to higher equilibrium 
retail prices than those which would emerge in a multi-product monopoly market. The reason is 
that each manufacturer selects a below-cost wholesale price to control the retail pricing of the 
fringe good, and this motivates her rival to solicit higher retail prices (both for her own product 
and for the fringe good) to capitalize on the retailers’ ability to acquire artiﬁcially high rents on 
sales of the rival manufacturer’s good. 
2. The model 
� Consider a “2 × 2 × 2” successive oligopoly structure with two goods, two manufacturers, 
and two retailers. Good 1 is a “name brand” produced by a monopoly manufacturer and good 2 
is a “generic brand” supplied to the retailers by a competitive fringe. Production of each good 
involves constant unit cost, denoted c1 and c2, and for simplicity, retail costs are suppressed. 
The retailers engage in pure intermediation, procuring goods from manufacturers at wholesale 
prices w 1 and w 2 in the upstream market and selling goods to consumers in the downstream 
market. 
Due to economies of “one-stop” shopping that pervade retail environments (Bliss, 1988), 
each consumer purchases a consumption bundle (y1, y2) from a single retailer. Given her choice 
of retailer j ∈ {1,2} and consumption bundle, a consumer obtains the utility 
� 
� 
2) − 
� 
1 i iu(y , y p j y , (1) 
i=1,2 
where y i is the quantity of good i purchased, and pj
i is the price of good i at retail location j. 
We assume u(.) is increasing and concave with bounded ﬁrst derivatives and that own product 
effects dominate cross-effects, | dlnui / dlnyi |> | dlnui / dlnyj | for j �= i, where ui ≡ ∂u(.)/∂y i . 
The products can be substitutes, u12 ≡ ∂2u(.)/∂y1∂y2 < 0, complements u12 > 0, or independent 
goods, u12 = 0. The optimal consumption choice at retailer j yields the indirect utility 
� � 
2) − 
� 
∗ ∗ 1 2 1 i iu j ≡ u pj , pj = max u(y , y p j y . (2) {y1 ,y2} 
i=1,2 
A consumer’s choice between retailers is determined in a standard Hotelling framework, with 
the two retailers located at either end of the unit interval.4 Consumers are uniformly distributed 
on this interval and incur preference (travel) cost of t per unit distance. The location θ ∈ [0,1] 
represents a consumer’s distance from retailer 1, and (1 − θ ) her distance from retailer 2. This, a 
θ -type consumer, obtains net utility u ∗ 1 − tθ if purchasing from retailer 1 and u ∗ 2 − t(1 − θ ) if  
purchasing from retailer 2. Given retail prices for each good at each retailer, a consumer of type � � �� � � ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ θ u1, u = (1/2) + u − u /(2t)2 1 2 
is indifferent between the retailers, and the market is partitioned into consumer types θ ≤ θ ∗ 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗(u ), who purchase both goods from retailer 1, and consumer types θ > θ  ∗ (u ), who 1, u2 1, u2
purchase both goods from retailer 2. 
3. Collective optimum and no contract outcomes 
� In this section, we examine how the retail pricing outcome departs from the collective 
optimum in an environment without contracts. We then characterize the role of vertical restraints 
in aligning incentives between a dominant manufacturer and the retailers of her product. We 
assume throughout the article that retailers cannot implement exclusive territories that would split 
the consumers between them, void any competition for customers, and thereby lead trivially to 
multi-product monopoly prices.5 For most examples in practice, exclusive territories are infeasible 
because consumers cannot be compelled to buy from a given retailer. 
A vertically integrated monopolist solves: 
1 1 1 1∗ 2∗max (pi − ci )yi (p , p2) ≡ �(p , p2; c , c2) ⇒ {p , p }, (3) 
p1 ,p2 
i=1,2 
where yi(.) ≡ argmax {u(y1 , y2) − i yi }.6 The solution to (3) yields the maximum proﬁt i=1,2 p
1∗ 2∗ 1available in the market, � ∗ ≡ �( p , p ; c , c2). 
Next consider the choice problem of retailer 1.7 Absent contracts, the dominant ﬁrm selects 
a wholesale price w 1 and the competitive fringe prices at cost, w 2 = c2. Given these wholesale 
4 We suppress retailers’ choices of location because these choices are long run in nature, and are therefore likely to 
precede the contractual decisions of interest in this article. To a large extent, these decisions are based on considerations 
outside of our model, such as rents and the size and location of consumer markets. 
5 We therefore also assume that all consumers are served in this retail market, with t not so large as to foreclose the 
midpoint (θ = 1/2) consumer. 
6 We assume �() is concave for a relevant range of (p1, p2). This holds when u() is concave with third-order 
derivatives that are sufﬁciently small relative to second-order derivatives. 
7 Choices of retailer 2 are symmetric and thus omitted. 
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prices, the duopoly retailers compete in retail prices. Retailer 1 solves 
1 2 1 2 i i i 1 2 1 2max π1 p1 , p ; u¯2, w  , w  ≡ p − w y p1 , p φ p1 , p ; u¯21 1 1 11 2p1 ,p1 i=1,2 
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(4) 
where �(.) is deﬁned in (3). Normalizing the number of consumers to one, φ( p1
1 , p1
2; u¯2) = 
θ ∗ ∗ 1 2(u ( p1 , p1), u¯2) is the market demand for retailer 1, given the prices set by retailer 2 and the 
attendant utility level u¯2. The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a solution to (4) are � � � � � � 
i 
� � �� 
∂π1 ∂� ∂φ  ∂ y ∂φ  = φ + � − (w i − ci ) φ + yi = 0, (5)
1 1 1 1 1∂p ∂p ∂p ∂p ∂p1 1 1 1 1i=1,2 � � � � � � � � �� � i∂π1 ∂� ∂φ  ∂ y ∂φ  = φ + � − (w i − ci ) φ + yi = 0, (6)
2 2 2 2 2∂p ∂p ∂p ∂p ∂p1 1 1 1 1i=1,2 
where, using Roy’s identity, � � � � ��
i ∗ i i 1 2∂φ/∂ p = ∂u ∂ p /2t = −y p1 , p 2t < 0. (7)1 1 1 
1∗ 2∗Notice that the collective optimum (p , p ) is achieved when the ﬁrst term in each of 
equations (5) and (6) is equal to zero. Hence, the individual incentives of a retailer are compatible 
with the collective interest only when the remaining terms sum to zero. These terms correspond 
to two distortions. First, on the interretailer margin, higher prices by retailer 1 prompt consumers 
to switch to the rival retailer (the business-stealing effect). This loss of store trafﬁc is costly to the 
retailer, but of no concern to the vertically integrated chain. The business-stealing effect provides 
the retailer with an incentive to set each retail price below the level which maximizes joint proﬁts. 
Second is an effect on the intraretailer margin. To the extent that the retailer pays above-cost 
wholesale prices to its suppliers (w i > c i), retail price effects on demand have a smaller impact 
on retailer proﬁt than on the proﬁt of the vertically integrated chain, which faces true cost c i. This  
“double-marginalization” effect generally induces the retailer to set prices above the level which 
maximizes joint proﬁts. 
Now, following Winter (1993) (and recalling that w 2 = c2), suppose that the wholesale price 
of good 1 is selected so that the business-stealing and double-marginalization effects exactly 
offset for the good 1 retail price, � � 
1 
� 
1 
�(.) ∂φ  ∂ p1 
w 1 − c = � � � � � � �� > 0. (8) 
∂ y1 1 + y1 1φ ∂ p ∂φ  ∂ p1 1 
With the wholesale prices set as in (8), the last terms in (5) vanish. Nevertheless, the retailers 
compete for customers by jointly selecting prices for both goods. In general, the wholesale price 
in (8) does not also elicit the collectively optimal price of the fringe good 2 in (6). Formally, with 
w 1 set as in (8), evaluating equation (6) when p2 equals its integrated optimum, p2∗, yields �� � �� � � � � �� � �� 
1∗ 2∗ 1 2 1 1 1 1 2∂π1( p , p ; u¯2, w  , c2) � φ� ∗ ∂φ  ∂ p ∂ y ∂ p − ∂φ  ∂ p ∂ y ∂ p1 1 1 1 � = � � � � � � < 0. 8 (9)
2 � 1 1∂ p1 eq.(8) φ ∂ y1 ∂ p1 + y1 ∂φ  ∂ p1 
The inequality in (9) implies that the retailer discounts the price of good 2 below p2∗ in order to 
attract customers. Hence, absent contracts, a monopoly manufacturer cannot set her wholesale 
1∗ 2∗price to induce her retailers to set collectively optimal retail prices for both goods, (p , p ). 
8 With ∂y1/∂p1
1 < 0, ∂φ/∂p1 
i < 0, � ∗ > 0, and φ >  0, the inequality holds by inspection for independent goods and 
substitutes (∂y1/∂p2 ≥ 0). For complementary goods (∂y1/∂p12 < 0), the inequality follows from our assumption, | dlnui /1 
dlnyi |> | dlnui / dlnyj | for j=� i. 
4. Monopoly-retailer contracts 
� Analysis. We now characterize contracts between the monopoly manufacturer and her 
retailers that elicit collectively optimal retail prices. This task would be trivial if contracts could 
stipulate the retail price for the fringe product (p2 = p2∗) and punish any defections from this price. 
But such cross-product restraints would run afoul of prevailing antitrust law in most industrial 
countries, for instance violating both the “tying doctrine” and proscriptions against price ﬁxing in 
U.S. case law irrespective of whether a “rule of reason” is applied.9 Another direct cross-market 
control is a contract that requires retailers to levy a “slotting fee” on the rival manufactured 
good. Such a contract, recently considered by Innes and Hamilton (2006), would be difﬁcult to 
enforce due to the dominant ﬁrm’s inability to observe and verify retail contracts with fringe 
suppliers. We rule out such direct cross-product restraints as being either overtly anti-competitive 
or unenforceable,10 and consider monopoly-retailer contracts that instead have only three terms: 
resale price maintenance (RPM) for the dominant manufacturer’s good (requiring p1 = p1R = 
p1∗), a wholesale price (w 1), and a ﬁxed tariff (f 1) to redistribute rents.11 
We assume that these contract terms are determined by bargaining (see, for example, Macleod 
and Malcomson, 1995). Because the issue of interest here is the contract form that achieves the 
collective optimum, we do not describe the precise structure of the bargaining game. Instead, we 
assume that the game has a unique subgame-perfect bargaining equilibrium that splits collective 
gains from contract implementation according to a known rule (as in Rubinstein, 1982; Shaked, 
1987; and others). 
We also assume, for now, that the retailers are unable to sign contracts with good 2 
manufacturers. For instance, each retailer may be vertically integrated with a good 2 manufacturer, 
as in the case of a supermarket in-store bakery. If the monopoly manufacturer imposes a vertical 
restraint on her retail price of p1R = p1∗, then her retailers no longer optimize over the good 1 
price, and the integrated optimum can be attained if a wholesale price, w 1, can be found to induce 
2 2∗ 2 2the duopoly retailers to select p = p per equation (6). By inspection (and with w = c by 
construction), the wholesale price that achieves this integrated optimum is 
9 Although cross-market price controls differ from tied product sales, they represent a cross-market tie that 
transparently ﬁxes prices. Prevailing case law in the United States proscribes such conduct and this is likely why, in 
practice, ﬁrms may use less transparent means to exercise cross-market control. For example, in the Northern Paciﬁc 
Railway decision (Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 1958), the Supreme Court afﬁrmed that “among 
the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed unlawful in and of themselves are price ﬁxing . . .  and tying 
arrangements.” Under the rule of reason (as endorsed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor), a cross-market tying restriction 
is judged to run afoul of antitrust law if the restriction has anti-competitive effects in the tied market, as is the case with 
a cross-market restraint that supports an elevated market price for the rival good. 
10 In doing so, we abstract from the potential ability of retailers to make implicit cross-market commitments in a 
repeated game. Three observations are relevant on this subject. First, for the explicit contracts (on veriﬁable outcomes) 
that we study, it is not difﬁcult to construct bonding provisions that make the contracts self-enforcing. With implicit 
commitments, in contrast, any bonds would themselves become the object of dispute in the event of “commitment 
breach,” arguably voiding their use as punishment. Even in a repeated relationship with perfect information, it is not clear 
how or whether a retailer’s self-interested departure from an implicit cross-market pricing commitment can be deterred 
by a rational (subgame-perfect) punishment. Second, assuming rational punishments can render implicit commitments 
incentive compatible, such commitments would presumably be tougher to enforce than the simple vertical contracts that 
we characterize here. Hence, because the contracts we consider support the collectively optimal outcome, the possibility 
of implicit commitments does not void the motives we identify for vertical restraints. Third, a word of caution. For legal 
restrictions on vertical contracts, such as antitrust policies that ban RPM (see below in Section 4), the potential for implicit 
commitments is crucial. If such commitments are possible, but not veriﬁable, then antitrust policy governing vertical 
restraints would be completely ineffectual. 
11 With these simple contracts, we will show that the monopolist can achieve the collective optimum. Hence, there 
is no loss in generality from restricting contracts to this form. Equivalently, the vertical restraint could involve a good 1 
quantity provision (e.g., at the level y1 = y1(p1∗ , p2∗)/2 in the symmetric two-retailer case) in place of RPM (see Reiffen, 
1999). For more on the equivalence between various forms of vertical restraints in a deterministic setting, see Mathewson 
and Winter (1984). For simplicity, we assume that contracts are observable to both retailers. For complications from 
unobservable contracts, see Cre´mer and Riordan (1987) and O’Brien and Shaffer (1992). 
� � 
2 
� 
�(.) ∂φ  ∂ p
w 1 − c1 = � � � � � 1 � �� . (10) 
φ ∂ y1 ∂ p1
2 + y1 ∂φ  ∂ p12 
In a symmetric retail market equilibrium (where φ = 1/2), equation (10) reduces to 
1 ∗ 2∗ w 1 − c = � y /δ, (11) 
i∗ 1∗where y = y i(p , p 2∗), i = 1, 2, is the equilibrium quantity of brand i sold by each retailer 
∗ 1∗ 1in the collective optimum; � = �(p , p2∗; c , c2) is the maximum proﬁt level that solves 
1∗ 2∗ − t(∂y1∗/∂pproblem (3); and δ ≡ y y 2). Notice that δ is positive in the case of independent and 
complementary goods (∂y1∗/∂p2 ≤ 0), but can be negative for highly substitutable goods. 
1∗ 2∗Deﬁnition: Substitute goods 1 and 2 are weak substitutes when δ = y y − t(∂ y1∗ /∂ p2) > 0 
and strong substitutes when δ < 0. 
In the case of independent goods, ∂y1/∂p2 = 0, notice that the wholesale price in (11) is 
selected so that (w 1 − c1) y1∗ = � ∗. This is an intuitive result. Because the wholesale price of the 
fringe product is set at marginal cost, w 2 = c2, the retailers depart from the collective optimum 
due only to the business-stealing incentive. Each retailer wishes to discount the price of good 2 to 
attract customers from his rival, and this incentive is eliminated when the dominant ﬁrm selects 
her wholesale price to fully extract variable per-customer proﬁt from her retailers. To do so, sales 
of product 1 are made below invoice (w 1 > p1∗)—a “loss leader” outcome—so that each retailer’s 
loss on good 1 exactly offsets his gain on sales of good 2 at the integrated price p2∗ . 
When the retail goods are not independent, the wholesale price must also correct for the 
incentive of retailers to shift consumers between the two goods on the intraretailer margin. Here 
the sign of δ is crucial, reﬂecting a tension between two effects in the retailers’ choice of p2. To  
see this, consider the outcome for substitute goods when the dominant manufacturer raises w 1 
1R 1∗above c1. As  w 1 rises, the resulting reduction in per-customer rents under the restraint p = p
dampens retailers’ business-stealing incentives, and this favors a higher p2. But a smaller retail 
margin on good 1 also reduces the opportunity cost of siphoning off sales of good 1 by offering 
a price discount on good 2, and this “siphoning effect” favors a lower p2. 
In the case of strong substitutes, the siphoning effect dominates the business-stealing effect, 
and the contract must combine a vertical restraint with a lower w1 (below c1) to induce retailers 
to raise the price of good 2. Accordingly, with w 2 = c2 and w 1 < c1, per-customer retail proﬁt 
is positive, � = �(p1∗ , p2∗; w 1, c2) > 0. In the case of weak substitutes, the business-stealing 
1 1 2effect dominates and the monopolist raises w above c to stimulate her retailers to raise p . 
With w 1 raised above c1, a higher p2 provides smaller rents on the intraretailer margin from 
switching consumption to good 1 than it does for the integrated ﬁrm. Consequently, as long as 
the retailers have an incentive to steal customers, they select p2 < p2∗. Only if retailers instead 
have incentives to rid themselves of customers (i.e., � < 0) can integrated pricing incentives be 
restored.12 
Note that the sign and magnitude of δ depends upon both the strength of the cross-price 
effect on demand, ∂y1/∂p2, and on retailer differentiation (as measured by the travel cost t). When 
t is high, implying little interretailer rivalry, the goods are strong substitutes (δ < 0). Conversely, 
when t is low, the goods are weak substitutes (δ >  0). Put differently, t acts as an implicit 
weight on the relative strength of the siphoning (versus business-stealing) effect. In a perfectly 
contestable retail market (t = 0), the business-stealing effect is all that matters and proﬁt per 
customer must be completely eliminated to attain monopoly pricing. As t rises, business-stealing 
incentives decline, reducing the retailers’ incentive to discount the price of good 2. This lowers 
2 1 112 If the goods are complements, the “siphoning effect” also favors a higher p . Hence, setting w above c
unambiguously prompts the retailer to elevate p2, thereby countering the underpricing that otherwise results from 
business-stealing incentives. In the monopolist’s optimum, w 1 is elevated just far enough to exactly offset the positive 
business-stealing incentives that result from positive per-customer proﬁt (� > 0). 
TABLE 1 Summary of Contract Outcomes 
Retail Goods Are: Wholesale Price 
Variable 
Retail Proﬁt 
Complements 
Independent 
Weak substitutes 
Strong substitutes 
w 1∗ > c1 
w 1∗ > p1∗ > c1 
w 1∗ > p1∗ > c1 
w 1∗ < c1 
� > 0 
� = 0 
� < 0 
� > 0 
the necessary deviation of wholesale price from cost to restore the integrated outcome.13 
In the event that δ = 0, equation (11) has no bounded solution. For this case, the business-
stealing and siphoning effects exactly offset, so that changes in the wholesale price w 1 do not alter 
the retailers’ pricing decision for good 2. For now, we assume that δ is bounded away from zero. 
We relax this assumption in Section 5 when we consider retailer contracts with fringe suppliers. 
In this setting, a dominant manufacturer can use RPM and two-part tariffs to acquire horizontal 
control over the rival good for all values of δ (including δ = 0). 
In summary, we have the following outcomes (see Table 1): 
Proposition 1. Suppose each retailer is vertically integrated with a fringe manufacturer so that 
2 1 1∗ 2 w = c2. Then the dominant ﬁrm can achieve the collective optimum (p = p , p = p2∗) using  
a contract that imposes a vertical restraint (p1R = p1∗) and sets: (i) w 1 < c1 when the goods are 
strong substitutes (δ < 0), and (ii) w 1 > c1 when the goods are weak substitutes, complements, or 
independent (δ > 0). With strong substitutes or complements, per-customer retail proﬁt is positive 
in equilibrium (� > 0); with independent goods, it is zero (� = 0); and with weak substitutes, 
it is negative (� < 0). Negative, zero, and small positive per-customer retail proﬁt is achieved in 
each case with loss-leader pricing (w 1 > p1 = p1∗). 
� Loss-leader example: gasoline stations and convenience stores. Consider the case of an 
oil company that distributes gasoline through dealer-operated stations that contain convenience 
stores (“quick stops”). The stations procure in-store consumption commodities from a set of 
competitive industries, which we assume can be aggregated into a composite consumption good. 
The in-store composite good is weakly related or independent from gasoline in consumption, 
and economies of multi-product purchases arise that favor the joint purchase of gasoline and 
consumer goods.14 
Our model predicts RPM contracts for gasoline that exhibit “loss leadership” (w 1 > p1). 
In practice, gasoline at convenience stores is widely recognized to be a loss leader, especially 
in urban areas (Bulow et al., 2001).15 Indeed, a number of state statutes in the United States 
explicitly prohibit below-cost gasoline pricing in light of this possibility, for instance Tennessee’s 
Petroleum Trade Practices Act and Florida’s Motor Fuel Marketing Practices Act. 
There are three types of arrangements for marketing of branded gasoline: (i) company-
operated stations, (ii) lessee dealerships, and (iii) dealer-owned stations. The prevalence of these 
different arrangements varies by region. For example, on the U.S. West Coast, lessee-dealer sales 
represent almost 50% of the market (Meyer and Fischer, 2004). In some states, company-operated 
dealerships are prohibited by “divorcement” statutes. 
113 Formally, d(w 1−c1)/dt | eq.(11) q = s ∂y1/∂p2, which is negative for complements (where w 1−c >0) and positive 
for strong substitutes (where w 1 − c1<0). For weak substitutes, (w 1 − c1) rises with t. The reason is that, as t rises, the 
extent of underpricing falls, but the effectiveness of an increased wholesale price (w 1), in spurring a higher p2, also falls. 
The second effect dominates, requiring a higher wholesale price deviation in order to fully correct underpricing. 
14 Per-customer gasoline demand is determined by considerations such as automobile size that are unlikely to be 
strongly related to a consumer’s demand for convenience products. 
15 Note that urban gasoline stations have signiﬁcant repeat custom and, hence (consistent with our model), customers 
with good information about store prices. 
Our analysis is most relevant to lessee dealerships and arguably branded dealer-owned 
stations that also contract with the central marketing company. Lessee dealer contracts typically 
involve two types of ﬁxed payments to the brand company, a ﬁxed purchase price for the 
franchise and periodic lease payments. In addition, contracts stipulate the dealer tank wagon 
(DTW) wholesale price for gasoline purchases from the company, and involve minimum volume 
requirements (Meyer and Fischer, 2004). Minimum purchase requirements are also common in 
contracts with dealer-owned stations (www.state.hi.us/lrb/rpts95/petro/pet4.html). 
In these contracts, the minimum volume requirements play the same role as the RPM 
modelled in this article when the resale price (p1) is below the wholesale (DTW) price (w 1). 
In particular, the joint use of wholesale (DTW) pricing and minimum volume requirements can 
compel the station to make gasoline a loss leader and compensate with proﬁtable convenience 
store sales, and this tempers the return to stealing business from other stations of the branded 
marketer by discounting the prices of in-store convenience items. 
If gasoline and convenience goods are independent in consumption, our model predicts 
either no ﬁxed transfers or ﬁxed payments from the branded monopolist to lessee dealers. There 
are two reasons why observed ﬁxed payments may go in the other direction. First, if the goods are 
weak complements, our model predicts loss leadership and positive per-customer proﬁt that, if 
the oil company has the preponderance of bargaining power, would largely be rebated by dealers 
to the brand company. Second, with interbrand competition (e.g., Exxon versus Texaco), a given 
brand-name oligopolist would temper dealers’ business-stealing incentives (to avoid intrabrand 
business stealing), but not eliminate them (to encourage interbrand business stealing). In this 
case, even with independent goods, positive per-customer retail proﬁt would exist that would be 
rebated back to the brand company, with loss leading to reduce intrabrand business stealing. 
� Minimum versus maximum RPM. Although antitrust policy toward resale price restraints 
is ﬂuid and varies across jurisdictions, the presumed anti-competitive effects that often determine 
the legality of these practices are judged by whether they raise prices or not (see Comanor and 
Rey, 1997). Under such a criterion, minimum resale prices are illegal in the European Union 
(because they can only serve to raise prices), but maximum resale prices are not. In the United 
States, minimum RPM was per se illegal prior to June 2007, whereas maximum RPM has been 
judged by the less restrictive rule of reason since 1997.16 In our model, equilibrium resale price 
restraints can take either form. 
Corollary 1. The optimal contract of Proposition 1 requires minimum resale prices (p1 ≥ p1∗) in  
the case of strong substitutes and maximum resale prices (p1 ≤ p1∗) in all other cases. 
Absent restraint, the below-cost good 1 wholesale price for strong substitutes would spur 
retailers to charge a good 1 retail price that is below the monopoly level p1∗. Conversely, loss-leader 
pricing for weak substitutes would lead retailers to charge a higher retail price. 
Judging anti-competitive effects of the vertical contract is more complicated than the 
“minimum versus maximum” distinction suggests. To see this, consider the effect of banning 
maximum RPM in the case of weak substitutes. Absent RPM, the dominant ﬁrm selects a 
wholesale price (w 1) above the level that elicits the monopoly price p1∗ in order to induce her 
retailers to charge a higher retail price for the fringe good. The optimal two-part contract balances 
the marginal cost of the good 1 price distortion (p1 > p1∗) on proﬁts with the marginal beneﬁt 
of stimulating an increase in the price of good 2 (p2 < p2∗). Hence, relative to the optimal 
RPM contract that supports (p1∗ , p2∗), the good 1 price rises and the good 2 price falls. Banning 
maximum RPM can raise or lower economic welfare depending upon which effect dominates. 
16 Minimum RPM was deemed per se illegal in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons (220 U.S. 373, 
1911); in 1968, maximum RPM was also judged to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act (Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 
U.S. 145, 1968). In two more recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has ruled that both forms of RPM should be 
judged by a “rule of reason,” in 1997 for maximum RPM (State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 1997), and in 2007 for minimum 
RPM (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., Slip Op. no. 06–480). 
For strong substitutes, in contrast, both effects work in the same direction. When faced with 
a dominant siphoning effect, the monopoly manufacturer sets her wholesale price (w 1) below the 
level that elicits the monopoly price p1∗ in order to spur a higher good 2 price. Again, the optimal 
two-part contract balances the marginal cost of the good 1 price distortion (p1 < p1∗) with the 
marginal beneﬁt of raising the good 2 price (p2 < p2∗); however, this tradeoff now leads to lower 
prices for both goods. Banning minimum RPM is thus pro-competitive. In sum17: 
1 1∗ 2Corollary 2. Banning minimum RPM lowers both retail prices (p < p , p < p2∗) and thus raises 
economic welfare. In contrast, banning maximum RPM can lead to a higher retail price for one 
good and a lower retail price for the other good. 
5. Retailer-fringe contracts 
� Analysis. We now turn to the possibility of retailer contracting with suppliers of the fringe 
good. Vertical separation from a competitive manufacturing sector is generally desirable for 
a retailer because it permits the design of contracts that soften downstream price competition 
(Shaffer, 1991a). A similar incentive exists for separation between retailers and fringe suppliers 
in a multi-product retail environment, but with one important caveat: unlike monopoly-retail 
contracts, which are designed to control retail pricing for mutual advantage, retail-fringe contracts 
essentially involve a retailer’s attempt to regulate his own pricing behavior. With repeated contracts 
over time, the ability to do so may be limited; that is, a retailer may recognize the average cost of 
fringe supply (true marginal cost) even when the contracted wholesale price is above cost. This 
would be the case, for example, if the retailer cannot commit to an exclusive supply arrangement, 
in which case no fringe supplier would be willing to pay the upfront slotting fees characterized 
below. Often, however, we expect relatively long term exclusive supply contracts to be possible 
(due in part to the ﬁxed costs of establishing a vertical relationship). Consistent with the literature, 
we make this assumption here. 
Consider the following four-stage game. First, the monopoly manufacturer selects a contract 
with each retailer that stipulates a wholesale price (w 1), ﬁxed fee (f 1), and RPM (p1R = p1∗), as 
before. Second, each retailer signs an independent contract with a fringe supplier that stipulates 
a wholesale price (w 2) and a ﬁxed tariff (f 2).18 Third, given observable wholesale prices from the 
ﬁrst two stages, retailers compete in fringe good retail prices p2 (with good 1 prices determined 
by contract). Finally, production and exchange occur.19 
The analytical challenge is to show that, given a vertical restraint (p1R = p1∗), there is a 
wholesale price w 1 that prompts the duopoly retailers to sign two-part contracts with fringe 
suppliers which in turn yield the collective optimum (p1∗ , p2∗). Vertical separation occurs in this 
setting whenever retailers choose contracts with w 2 � c2= . 
When contracting with fringe suppliers, a retailer can require a lump-sum payment of f 2 i , 
let suppliers compete in wholesale prices (wi 
2) to acquire the contract, and select among suppliers 
with the lowest prices on offer. Hence, in equilibrium, the terms of the contract will satisfy the 
17 Additional (plausible) regularity conditions are needed for proof of this result (see the Appendix). Note, in 
addition, that our claimed effects of antitrust policy rely on our premise that implicit cross-market controls cannot be 
implemented by monopoly manufacturers (see note 10). If implicit commitments to cross-market retail prices can be 
made, then they will supplant any proscribed vertical restraint and continue to produce monopoly outcomes. 
18 The restriction to two-part retailer-fringe contracts comes at no cost in generality; as of the second stage, a 
retailer can mimic outcomes from any nonlinear fringe supply contract using a two-part equivalent. As is well known, 
this equivalence breaks down when there is uncertainty and asymmetric information that are absent in our model (see, 
for example, Mathewson and Winter, 1984; Martimort, 1996; Ku¨hn, 1997). 
19 In principle, different orders of play are possible, for example simultaneous contracting between (i) retailers and 
the dominant ﬁrm, and (ii) retailers and fringe suppliers. The qualitative results derived below are robust to such alternative 
games. Note, however, that different orders of play will generally lead to lower integrated proﬁt (because the monopoly 
manufacturer takes fringe wholesale markups as given and excludes these margins from joint proﬁt maximization). As a 
result, in an expanded game wherein retailers choose the order of contracting, the order that we assume (monopoly-retailer 
contracting ﬁrst) is an equilibrium outcome. 
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(competitive) zero-proﬁt condition, 
2 2 2 1 2 w − c y pi , p φ(.) = f 2 . (12)i i i 
Note that (12) applies whether the retail contract stipulates a ﬁxed payment from the supplier to 
the retailer, f 2 i > 0, or vice versa; hence, we impose no restriction on the sign of f 
2 
i . 
Next, deﬁne the per-customer retail proﬁt function as 
1 1 1�(p , p2; w , w  2) = ( pi − w i )yi (p , p2). 
i=1,2 
Given retailer 1’s contracted wholesale price with the supplier of good 2 (w1
2), and the contractually 
predetermined wholesale and retail prices of good 1 (w 1 and p1 = p1∗), the retailer’s optimal price 
for good 2 ( p1
2) is determined as follows: � � � � �� � �
1∗ 2 1 2 1∗ 2 ∗ 1∗ 2 2 1 2 2max � p , p ; w ,w  φ p , p ; u = u p , p ⇒ p w , w  ; p , (13)1 1 1 2 1 22
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where p2
2 is the rival retailer’s price selection. Proceeding similarly with retailer 2, and equating 
the reaction functions, gives the equilibrium retail prices, 
2e 2e 1 2 2 2e 2e 2 2p = p w , w  ; w , p = p w1, w  ; w , (14)1 1 2 2 2 1 
where w2
2 is the good 2 wholesale price faced by retailer 2. In order for the equilibrium in (14) to 
be locally stable at the integrated optimum, the following regularity restriction must hold: 
Assumption 1. 
2(.
� ��
2∗ 2 1 2 2 2∗ 2 20At p ) = p , ∂ p w , w1; p2 = p ∂ p2 < 1. 
Turning to the contract stage, each retailer chooses the fringe wholesale price wi 
2 to maximize 
proﬁt subject to the subsequent price responses in (14). Given that supplier proﬁts are rebated to 
the retailer in the retailer-fringe contract (12), retailer 1’s problem is � � � � � � �� � � ��
1∗ 2e 1 2 2 1 2 1∗ 2e 1 2 2 ∗ 1∗ 2e 1 2 2max J = � p , p w , w  ; w ; w , c φ p , p w , w  ; w ; u = u p , p w , w  ; w .1 2 1 2 2 1
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(15) 
2 2 2The symmetric contract equilibrium solves (15), with w1 = w2 = w . 
Now consider the problem of the monopoly manufacturer. Her challenge is to select a 
wholesale price w 1 such that, with the resulting equilibrium w 2 from the retail contracts solving 
(15), retailers set good 2 retail prices to maximize integrated proﬁt, p2 = p2∗. To characterize this 
solution, we seek a wholesale price pair (w 1, w 2) that simultaneously satisﬁes two conditions in 
the symmetric retail equilibrium: (i) w 21 = w 2 solves (15) when w 22 = w 2, and (ii) the resulting 
2 2 2∗p1 = p2∗ in the pricing stage solves (13) when p2 = p . Assuming the requisite second-order 
2 2 2conditions hold, differentiating (13) with respect to p and evaluating at p = p = p2∗ gives 1 1 2 
1 1∗ 2∗ 1 i∗ 2F1(w , w  
2) = −�(p , p ; w , w  2)y2∗ − t (w i − ci )∂ y /∂ p = 0. (16) 
i=1,2 
When δ � 0, equation (16) has the closed-form solution w 1(w= 2) that yields the collectively optimal 
2 1 2 2∗ 2∗price selection for good 2, p = p2 (w , w 2 ; p2 = p ) = p . 
Similarly, to solve (15), we take the ﬁrst-order condition, use (13) and (14) to expand 
2 2 2terms, and evaluate when w1 = w2 = w and p2e() = p2∗ (by (16)) and φ = 1/2 (a symmetric 
1∗ 2∗20 Sufﬁcient conditions for Assumption 1 are: ∂2�(p , p2∗; w 1(w 2),w 2)/∂(p2)2 < 0 and  p y2∗+ t(dlny2∗/dln p2) ≥ 
0, where w 1(w 2) solves equation (16) below. 
� � � equilibrium)21: 
1 1∗ 2∗ 1 2∗ 2 , w  2) = �(p , p ; w , w  2)y ∂ p2() ∂ pF2(w 2 �� � � � ���
2∗ 2 2∗ 2+ (w 2 − c2) t∂ y /∂ p − (y )2 1 − ∂ p2()/∂ p2 = 0, (17) 
2 1 2 2∗ 2where ∂ p2 ()/∂ p = ∂ p2 (w , w 2 ; p = p )/∂ p2 2 2. 
Inspection of conditions (16) and (17) results in the following: 
Proposition 2. If the two goods are independent in consumption (∂y1∗/∂p2 = 0), then the collective 
2 1 1∗ 2∗ 1optimum is supported by w = c2 and w > p1∗ such that �(p , p ; w , c2) = 0. 
For independent goods, our results replicate those derived in Section 4. The monopoly 
manufacturer writes a loss-leading vertical contract (w 1 > p1∗) with her retailers that eliminates 
the retailers’ variable proﬁt per customer (� = 0). With zero variable proﬁt, the retailers gain no 
advantage by signing contracts with fringe suppliers: although a contract with a fringe supplier 
can be used to steal business from the rival retailer, shifting customers no longer shifts rent. 
Commensurately, retailer-fringe contracts do not arise. 
The above logic does not extend to goods that are not independent in consumption (∂y1()/ 
∂p2 �= 0). For these cases, we have: 
1∗ 2 2∗ 1∗ 2∗ 2∗Proposition 3. When ∂y /∂p � > c2 such that (w , w ) = (w ), w 2∗) solves  = 0, there is a w 1(w 
equations (16) and (17). Hence, the collective optimum can be achieved by vertical restraints on 
the retailers of the dominant manufacturer’s own good. The optimal contract prompts the retailers 
to set positive tariffs (f 2∗ > 0) on fringe manufacturers. 
Under the monopolist’s optimal contract, we demonstrate below that a retailer’s proﬁt 
per customer (�) can be either positive or negative in equilibrium (much as in Proposition 1). 
The novel aspect of Proposition 3 is that, in either case, retailers sign contracts with fringe 
suppliers that stipulate above-cost wholesale prices for good 2, w 2 > c2. When per-customer 
proﬁt is positive in the retail market (� >  0), the elevated wholesale price implicitly commits the 
retailer to charge a higher good 2 retail price, which is advantageous to the retailer because his 
rival responds with a higher good 2 price (Shaffer’s [1991a] insight). However, the retailers also 
ﬁnd an elevated wholesale price to be advantageous when per-customer proﬁt is negative in the 
retail market (� <  0). This is because the rival now responds with a lower retail price, which rids 
the contracting retailer of costly customers on the interretailer margin.22 By (12), the above-cost 
wholesale price is supported by positive tariffs on fringe suppliers (f 2 > 0). 
Understanding these retailer-fringe contractual incentives, the monopolist selects her 
wholesale price (w 1) so as to elicit integrated good 2 pricing. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the retailer’s 
1∗ 2∗ 1∗ 2∗proﬁt per customer under the optimal contract as � ∗∗ = �(p , p ; w , w ), and make use of 
the parameter δ deﬁned in (11),23 
1∗ 1∗ 2 2 1∗ 2∗ 2δ = y y2∗ − t∂ y /∂ p =s −dw 1(w 2)/dw =s d�( p , p ; w 1(w 2), w  2)/dw . (18) 
1∗ 1 121 From (2) and the deﬁnition of φ in (4), [∂φ()/∂u][∂u ∗(p , p2)/∂p2] = y2()/2t. With �(.; w , c2) = �(.; w , w 2) + 
(w 2 − c2) y2(p1∗ , p2), we have from (13), (d/dp2)[�(.; w 1, c2)φ()] = (w 2 − c2) {∂y2()/∂p2φ + y2()(∂φ/∂p2)}, where  ∂φ/ 
1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2∂p2 = −y2()/2t. Differentiating (14), ∂p2e(w , w2; w 2)/∂w2 = [∂p2e(w , w 2; w2)/∂w2](∂p2(w ,w 2; p2)/∂ p2) when  w = 
2 2 2 w2. Substituting into the ﬁrst-order condition for (15) when w = w2 and p2e() = p2∗ gives (17). 
22 The intuition for this rival retailer response is rather subtle. Speaking somewhat loosely, when � <  0, retailers 
set p2 at a high level that trades off two effects on retail proﬁt: (i) the marginal beneﬁt of a higher p2 in ridding the retailer 
of costly customers, and (ii) the marginal cost of higher p2 in lowering per-customer proﬁt �. Now, when the opposing 
retailer raises its price (due to an elevated wholesale price), the second effect—the marginal cost of a higher p2—becomes 
larger because the retailer’s market share rises. Because the ﬁrst (customer-shedding) beneﬁt of higher p2 is unchanged, 
the retailer responds with a lower price. 
23 The ﬁrst sign equality in (18) follows from differentiation of (16). The second follows from substitution 
for (dw 1(w 2)/dw 2) in the equation, d�()/dw 2 = −y1(dw 1(w 2)/dw 2) −y2, and appeals to our initial assumption 
that | dlnu1/dlny1 |> | dlnu1/dlny2 | . 
Recall that δ > 0 in the case of complementary goods, but that, for substitute goods, δ > 0 when 
the goods are weak substitutes and δ < 0 when the goods are strong substitutes. 
2 ∗∗ 1∗Proposition 4. (i) When the retail goods are complements (∂y1∗/∂p < 0), � > 0 and w >c1; 
2 ∗∗ 1∗ 1∗(ii) when the retail goods are weak substitutes (∂y1∗/∂p > 0), � < 0 and w > p > c1; and 
2 ∗∗ 1∗ 1(iii) when the retail goods are strong substitutes (∂y1∗/∂p > 0), � > 0 and w < c . 
The intuition for Proposition 4 is straightforward. Consider the starting point of marginal 
cost good 1 pricing, w 1 = c1. When retailers raise their good 2 wholesale prices with fringe 
contracts (w 2 > c2), they reduce—but do not eliminate—their incentive to discount good 2. This 
is because fringe contracts create two effects: (i) on the inter retailer margin, customers are now 
less proﬁtable, which decreases incentives to discount p2; and (ii) on the intraretailer margin, the 
opportunity cost of reducing good 2 sales by elevating p2 falls. As a result, retailer-fringe contracts 
temper both the business-stealing and siphoning effects, which reduces, but does not eliminate, 
the manufacturer’s incentive to distort the good 1 wholesale price from marginal cost. 
Corollary 3. Retailer-fringe contracting reduces the extent to which good 1 wholesale prices 
depart from cost, | w 1 − c1 | , implying a higher wholesale price when the goods are strong 
substitutes, and a lower wholesale price when the goods are weak substitutes or complements. 
The preceding results are derived under the premise of a non-zero δ. Unlike the case of 
vertically integrated retailers considered in Section 4, however, the δ � 0 restriction is not = 
necessary for the exercise of horizontal control when the retailers are vertically separated from 
their good 2 suppliers. Even when δ = 0, there is an above-cost good 2 wholesale price, wˆ 2 > c2, 
that elicits optimal good 2 retail pricing, p 2 = p 2∗. Formally, evaluating (16) when δ = 0 yields 
2 ∗ ∗ wˆ2 − c = y � /γ > 0, (19) 
where γ ≡ (y2∗)2 − t(∂ y2∗ /∂ p2) > 0 is the good 2 counterpart to δ. This above-cost wholesale 
price can be supported by endogenous retailer-selected slotting fees that, in turn, are inﬂuenced by 
the dominant manufacturer’s choice of the good 1 wholesale price. To see this, suppose w 1 is set 
equal to unit cost (w 1 = c1). The retailers then set positive slotting fees on good 2 for the strategic 
reasons observed by Shaffer (1991a). Due to business-stealing incentives, however, these fees do 
not fully counter interretailer competition, and the resulting wholesale prices are set below the 
level necessary to induce monopoly pricing of good 2 (w 2 < wˆ2). The dominant manufacturer 
responds by lowering her wholesale price below cost (w 1 < c1), which raises per-customer retail 
proﬁt and thereby increases retailers’ incentives to raise slotting fees. The strategic beneﬁt to 
setting a higher wholesale price (w 2) is now greater for retailers because the resulting increase in 
the rival retailer’s retail price (p2)—and the associated shift in custom—is now more proﬁtable. 
Proposition 5. When δ = 0, the collective optimum can be achieved by a vertical restraint on 
the dominant manufacturer’s good (p1R = p1∗), and a below-cost wholesale price, w 1 ∈ (−∞, c1), 
that supports the good 2 wholesale price, wˆ 2 > c2, deﬁned in equation (19). 
For cases in which δ is close or equal to zero, Proposition 5 provides a new explanation 
for vertical separation between retailers and competitive suppliers as a mechanism to facilitate 
horizontal control of the marketplace. 
� Application to supermarkets. Supermarkets, drug chains, and mass merchandisers fre­
quently offer private-label (“store-brand”) products that closely substitute for national brands.24 
24 In general, the term “private label” refers to any product in which a manufacturer enters into a relationship with 
a buyer to use the buyer’s name on its product. Under this deﬁnition, private labels are sold in a wide variety of product 
categories including wine, credit cards, medical equipment, electronics, software, and website content (both graphics 
and text). Here we choose to use the terms “private label” and “store brand” synonymously and focus on the case of 
supermarket private labels that are close substitutes for a national brand. 
Private-label products in the supermarket industry generate a signiﬁcant share of total retail sales 
(22% in Europe and 16% in North America in 2002) and, in the United States, have a greater 
market share than the leading manufactured brand in roughly 30% of all product categories. 
Private labels are supplied to retailers in three different ways: (i) direct production by the 
retailer (e.g., an in-store bakery); (ii) by the manufacturer of a national brand (e.g., Coca-Cola 
produces ASDA Cola in the United Kingdom); and (iii) by contract manufacturers specializing 
in private-label production (e.g., Ralcorp produces various ready-to-eat cereals and crackers). In 
the ﬁrst case, horizontal control can be achieved directly by vertical restraints without third-party 
contracts (as in Proposition 1). In the second case, a single manufacturer can maximize collective 
rents over the national brand and private-label, without the use of a vertical restraint, by jointly 
selecting wholesale prices. However, the third case is the most common, as the private label 
market is dominated by small, independent suppliers (Supermarket News, 1995). 
Private-label procurement at supermarkets typically occurs through the use of an in­
house broker (IHB). IHBs assist supermarkets with their private-label programs by selecting 
among potential private-label suppliers and by providing services such as procurement, category 
management, quality control, label design, retail pricing, and merchandising. Nearly 80% of 
private-label purchases by U.S. supermarkets are brokered through IHBs at a cost ranging from 
1% to 6% of sales (Marion, 1998). 
Consider a national brand manufacturer who imposes a vertical restraint to control the 
retail pricing of a supermarket private label. For strong substitutes, our model predicts the 
emergence of retailer contracts for private labels that involve lump-sum payments to supermarkets 
in exchange for elevated wholesale prices (w 2 > c2). Indeed, evidence suggests that IHBs rebate a 
signiﬁcant share of their brokerage commission to supermarket retailers. This is done either 
through direct cash payment from IHBs to their retailers or through “in-kind” rebates, for 
instance by placing supermarket employees on their payrolls and acquiring retail service functions 
previously performed by supermarket personnel. Marion (1998) estimates that up to 80%–95% 
of the brokerage commission collected from private-label suppliers by IHBs is rebated through 
lump-sum transfers to retailer accounts. To the extent that brokerage commissions on private-label 
sales pass through to wholesale prices, this practice raises the wholesale price of private-label 
products, w 2 > c2. 
Regarding contracts between national brand manufacturers and supermarket retail chains, 
our model predicts minimum resale price contracts that are per se illegal in Europe and, until 
2007, in the United States (see Comanor and Rey, 1997). If RPM were allowed, we would expect 
to see below-cost wholesale pricing of the national brand (w 1 < c1), and a tariff paid by retailers 
to the manufacturer of the national brand. However, we expect the proscription of RPM to instead 
spur legal two-part contracts such that the national brand wholesale price (w 1) is above cost, but 
lower than the level that would otherwise prompt monopoly pricing (p1∗). The lower wholesale 
price is advantageous to the manufacturer of the national brand because it yields a higher retail 
price for the private label; however, due to the proﬁt costs of lowering the wholesale price of the 
national brand, the contract would not go so far as to elicit a monopoly price for the private label. 
A ban on minimum RPM would therefore result in strictly lower retail prices for both goods. 
Given the illegality of RPM, our model also indicates that supermarket-fringe contracts for 
slotting allowances are anti-competitive. The direct effect of a retailer-fringe contract is to raise 
the retail price of good 2; however, there is also an indirect effect on good 1. The retailer-fringe 
contract reduces the incentive of manufacturer 1 to lower w 1 to achieve a higher p2, and this raises 
the retail price of good 1 (see Corollary 3). Slotting allowances on suppliers in a competitive 
fringe can thus lead to higher retail prices for both goods. 
6. Extensions 
� Oligopoly. We have assumed that good 1 is produced by a monopolist. Suppose instead 
that the upstream market for good 1 is populated by differentiated duopolists. We then have a 
three-good model that is otherwise the same as before. The three goods are the two duopoly­
supplied products (close substitutes that we will denote by 1A and 1B) and the fringe good. We 
1A 1Bassume that the ﬁrst two goods enter consumer utility u(y , y , y2) in a symmetric way. 
The duopoly competition is similar to that studied by Rey and Verge´ (2004). The key 
difference here is that we have a fringe market which the dominant manufacturers seek to control. 
In Rey and Verge´ (2004), an above-cost wholesale price by one duopolist induces the rival ﬁrm to 
support a retail price that is discounted below the monopoly level because the duopolist ignores 
the cost of the discounting to the rival’s margin. Using RPM to control retail pricing frees the 
manufacturers to set wholesale prices equal to marginal cost, thereby aligning vertical incentives. 
In our model, however, RPM does not void the duopolists’ interest in distorting their wholesale 
prices because these prices are used to control retailer pricing of the fringe good. Consequently, 
retail prices, in equilibrium, are driven away from monopoly levels. 
Consider the case in which retailers are integrated with a fringe supplier (as in Section 4). 
The duopolists negotiate observable three-part contracts (maintained retail price, wholesale price, 
and ﬁxed transfer) with the two retailers. Denoting the associated retail and wholesale price pairs 
1A 1Bby (p ,w 1A) and (p ,w 1B), and assuming common manufacturer unit costs c for all three goods 
(for symmetry and to avoid clutter), the retailers solve � � � 
max 
p2 
� ∗(p1A , p1B , p2) − 
i=1A,1B 
(w i − c)yi ( p1A , p1B , p2) φ � p1A , p1B , p2; u¯ � , (20) 
� 
1A 1Bi − c)yi ( p 2) is fully integrated proﬁt, ¯where � ∗() = (p , p , p u is consumer utility i=1A,1B,2 
1A 1Bat the rival retailer, and φ = (1/2) + [(u ∗( p , p , p2) − u¯)/(2t)] is the retailer’s market share. 
We envision two simultaneous bargaining games, in each of which the two retailers negotiate 
with one of the duopoly manufacturers, taking the contracts with the rival manufacturer as given.25 
As before, we abstract from particulars of the bargaining games that determine how collective 
gains are split between the contracting parties, and assume instead that the parties maximize joint 
rents and share their gains using ﬁxed transfers. Contracts between manufacturer 1A and her 
retailers thus solve the joint proﬁt maximization problem, 
� ∗∗(p1A 1B 1B) ≡ � ∗(p1A 1B 1B − c)y1B(p1A 1Bmax , p , p2; w , p , p2) − (w , p , p2), (21) 
p1A , p2 
which involves maximizing integrated proﬁt less manufacturer 1B’s margin. 
1A)Under plausible regularity restrictions, the duopoly retail price that solves problem (21) (p
declines with the wholesale price w 1B.26 A higher good 1A retail price, by stimulating demand for 
the substitute good 1B, yields proﬁt gains to manufacturer 1B that rise with the wholesale price 
w 1B. Because these gains are ignored by manufacturer 1A and her retail contracting partners, the 
contracting manufacturer counters a rise in w 1B with a decrease in p1A. 
In a symmetric contract (and pricing) equilibrium, we have the retail prices from (21),27 
1A 1B 1∗∗(w), 2 2∗∗(w),p = p = p p = p (22) 
and the wholesale price w = w 1A = w 1B that yields the latter fringe retail price from the retailers’ 
solution to (20); that is, w solves the ﬁrst-order condition for problem (20), 
2 1A 1A−� ∗∗()y + (w − c){y y2 − t(∂ y /∂ p2)} =  0, (23) 
25 We thereby sidestep potentially complex issues on the use of one duopolist’s contract to extract rents from the 
other duopolist’s contracting game. 
26 Sufﬁcient conditions for this property are (i) consistent with second-order conditions, | � ∗∗ | > | � ∗∗ | , where  2,2 1A,2 
� ∗∗ = ∂2� ∗∗ /∂ pi∂ p 1B/∂p1A ≥i, j j, and (ii) 1A and 1B are “stronger” substitutes than goods 1B and 2 in the sense that ∂y
1B/∂p 1B/∂p1A) � ∗∗ 1B/∂p2) � ∗∗| ∂y 2 | . Then (using second-order conditions): ∂p1A/∂w1B | eq.(20) =s (∂y – (∂y 1A,2< 0.2,2 
1A+(w 1B 1B27 Problem (21) yields solutions (p , p1B), p2+(w , p1B)). By symmetry, we can deﬁne the equilibrium price 
1A 1B: p1∗∗(w) = 1A: p1A 1A+(w,p1A), p2∗∗(w) = 2+(w, pfunctions for common w = w = w p = p p 1∗∗(w)). For stability of the 
1A+/∂p1Bretail pricing equilibrium, we assume that ∂p < 1 (c.f., Assumption 1). 
where all functions are evaluated at equilibrium prices. Equation (23) has two implications. First 
is the analog to equation (11)28: 
w − c = � ∗∗()y2/δA = s δA , (24) 
A ≡ y1A 2 − t(∂y1A/∂pwhere δ y 2). Second is the equilibrium retail proﬁt per customer: 
∗∗∗ ∗∗ − (w − c)y 1A 2� ≡ � 1A = −t(w − c)(∂ y /∂ p2)/y . (25) 
Together, (24) and (25) directly imply the key qualitative results of Proposition 1. 
The important distinction here is that the equilibrium retail prices do not maximize collective 
proﬁt, an unfortunate consequence of the duopolists’ lack of coordination in their contracting 
problems with retailers. Ordinarily, this coordination failure has favorable implications for 
consumer prices relative to the monopoly outcome; however, this is not necessarily the case here. 
Consider, for example, the case in which all three goods are strong, symmetric substitutes. In this 
1A 1B 2 1∗∗(w 1∗∗(wcase, a symmetric price equilibrium arises, p = p = p = p ), with dp )/dw < 0.29 
From problem (21), retail prices fall with the rival duopolist’s wholesale price w because the 
beneﬁt of higher retail prices on sales to customers who switch to the rival duopoly good is 
ignored. Hence, with w < c in equation (24), all retail prices are higher than would be charged by 
a fully integrated monopolist. Manufacturers charge retailers below-cost wholesale prices in order 
to spur them to raise their prices on the fringe good. The low wholesale price of the rival duopoly 
product, in turn, inﬂates the retail margin for that good, which raises the perceived rent on sales 
of the rival good to an artiﬁcially high level from the perspective of the contracting manufacturer. 
As a result, oligopolistic competition leads to an equilibrium outcome that is socially inferior to 
that which would emerge under monopoly. 
Of course, this is not a general conclusion. With weak substitutes, for example, the wholesale 
price w is raised above cost in order to spur a higher good 2 retail price (problem (20)). The 
elevated wholesale price in turn lowers the optimal good 1 retail price for the contracting parties 
1∗∗(wbelow the monopoly level (with d p )/dw < 0). Under plausible conditions, this also lowers 
2∗∗(wtheir optimal good 2 retail price (d p )/dw < 0). In sum, we have: 
Proposition 6. Duopoly production of good 1 leads to (i) below-cost wholesale prices (w < c) 
when the fringe good is a strong substitute (δA < 0), (ii) above-cost wholesale prices (w > c) 
otherwise, (iii) loss-leader pricing (w > p1∗∗) for independent goods, weak substitutes, and weak 
complements, and (iv) retail prices that depart from the collective integrated industry optimum 
1∗ 1∗∗(c), p2∗ 1∗∗ 1∗ 2∗∗(p = p = p2∗∗(c)). For independent goods, p < p , p = p2∗; for strong substitutes, 
1∗∗ 1∗ 2∗∗ 1∗∗ 1∗ 2∗∗ 1∗∗ 1∗ p > p , p > p2∗; for weak substitutes, p < p , p < p2∗; and for complements, p < p , 
2∗∗ 2∗ p > p . 
� Retail formats without product bundling. Until now we have considered a spatial 
downstream market that involves multi-product transactions between consumers and retailers. 
This bundling of consumer purchases in a single retail transaction is a natural property in many, 
but not all, retail markets. 
Is this bundling important for our results on horizontal control? For the case of independent 
goods (where ∂y 1(.)/∂p 2 = ∂2u(.)/∂y1∂y 2 = 0), the answer is “yes.” However, for all other cases, 
the answer is “no.” Consider a generalized statement of our model, with product k ∈ {1,2}
1 2 1 2demands at retailer i � j, (i, j) ∈ {1,2}, denoted by Dk( p i , p j , p ). Then three-part monopoly­= i , p j 
retailer contracts (with maintained price p1R, wholesale price w 1, and ﬁxed transfer) yield the 
28 The sign equality in (24) follows from � ∗∗() > 0 in a symmetric equilibrium in order for the duopoly manufacturers 
to earn nonnegative proﬁt. (� ∗∗≤0 implies the contradiction of w > c and zero manufacturer proﬁt.) 
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ 1A29 Here, by symmetry and second-order conditions, we have 0 < −�2, = −� 1A > | �1 A,2 | and ∂ y1B/∂ p = 2 1A,
∂ y1B/∂ p2 > 0, implying that ∂p1A+/∂w1B | (20) < 0 (see note 26). Hence, with ∂p1A+/∂p1B < 1 (note 27), dp1∗∗(w)/dw = 
1A+/∂p1B)] < 0.[∂p1A+/∂w]/[1 − (∂p
� � � � � � 
� 
� 
following retailer i choice for the fringe good price p2 i , assuming the retailer has integrated good 
2 production (for simplicity): 
1R − w 1R 2 1R 2 2 2 D2 1R 2 1R 2max(p 1)D1 p , pi , p , p + p − c p , pi , p , p . (26)2 j i j pi 
Compare this choice to that for the fully integrated industry: 
1 1 1∗ 2∗max (pk − ck)Dk(p , p2; p , p2) → (p , p ). (27) 
p1 , p2
 
k=1,2
 
Examining the respective ﬁrst-order conditions, the solution to problem (26) is supported 
by contracts that set p1R = p1∗ and w 1 that satisfy � � 
2
� � � 
2
� −(w 1 − c1) ∂D1(.) ∂ pi = ( pk − ck) ∂Dk(.) ∂ p j . (28) 
k=1,2 
Now suppose that consumers do not have multi-product purchase economies and therefore 
can buy one good from one retailer and the other good from the other retailer, without cost. If the 
two goods are also independent in consumption, the retailers’ good 1 demands are completely 
invariant to good 2 prices, ∂D1 (.)/∂ pi 
2 = ∂D1 (.)/∂ p2 j = 0. Because good 2 demands depend on 
good 2 prices, ∂D2 (.)/∂ p2 j > 0, there is no wholesale price (w 
1) that can satisfy condition (28) for 
this case. When the two goods are completely independent in both consumption and the shopping 
process, retail pricing of the monopoly good 1 and the fringe good 2 are also independent; hence, 
the monopolist cannot control the latter with her contract on the former. In this case, there is a 
motive for cross-market control, but these controls must be explicit, for instance through the use 
of tying arrangements, commodity bundling, or cross-market slotting fees of the form described 
by Innes and Hamilton (2006). 
If the two goods are not independent in consumption, then ∂D1(.)/∂ pi 
2 � and= 0, 
equation (28) has a solution. Our main conclusions then stand. Hence, any jointness between 
products in either consumption or shopping enables the monopolist to exert horizontal control 
using a three-part vertical contract with no explicit cross-market terms. Moreover, with 
∂Dk (.)/∂ p2 j > 0, the wholesale cost distortion is the same as described in Proposition 1, 
2(w 1 − c1) =s δ ≡ −∂D1(.)/∂ pi . 
7. Conclusion 
� In this article, we study how a vertical restraint by a manufacturer of one good can be 
used to simultaneously control the retail pricing of another good, resulting in the extension 
of monopoly power to a second market. The central elements required for this to occur are: 
(i) a multi-product retail market in which oligopoly retailers compete in common goods; (ii) a 
monopoly (or oligopoly) manufacturing industry in the upstream market for one of the goods; 
and (iii) an element of jointness between the goods in consumer demand. Jointness can arise 
either in consumption (so that a consumer’s demand for one good is affected by price of the other 
good) or in “shopping” (so that economies exist in buying both products at once). Because such 
jointness exists in a wide range of economic settings, our analysis suggests that antitrust scrutiny 
is warranted for vertical restraints, even when direct mechanisms for cross-market control, for 
instance explicit tying and price-ﬁxing arrangements, are not employed. 
We identify several symptoms of vertical contracts used to exert horizontal control, including 
predatory (below-cost) wholesale pricing for strong substitutes, retailer-driven “slotting fees” for 
competitive suppliers of the rival good, and loss-leader retail pricing for weak substitutes, weak 
complements, and independent goods. Some of these practices are commonplace; for example, 
transfers from contract manufacturers to retailers in the form of discounted loans, technology, 
and demonstration equipment are common in many retail settings. For the case of supermarket 
retailing, moreover, the available evidence indicates that direct cash transfers occur through 
rebates paid to retailers by in-house brokers of their private labels.30 
All of these symptoms, and the vertical restraints that underpin them, are the subject of 
the ongoing antitrust policy debate. For example, statutes prohibit below-cost retail pricing in a 
number of European countries and for gasoline in a number of U.S. states (Allain and Chambolle, 
2005). Antitrust law also proscribes predatory pricing. As elucidated in the case of Brooke Group 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (92-466, 509 U.S. 209, 1993), a prerequisite for below-
cost pricing to be deemed predatory—and thus illegal under U.S. law—is that the pricing ﬁrm 
has a reasonable prospect of recouping losses. This condition is satisﬁed in the vertical contracts 
characterized in this article (even though it was not satisﬁed in the Brooke case), because losses 
are recouped with ﬁxed transfers between the parties. 
Are legal proscriptions of below-cost pricing beneﬁcial to society? In our model, we 
distinguish between below-cost wholesale pricing (“predatory accommodation” associated with 
strong substitutes) and below-cost retail pricing (“loss leadership” for weakly related goods). A 
proscription against predation at the wholesale level prevents the monopolist from lowering her 
wholesale price below cost in order to spur a higher retail price for the rival good. Hence, if RPM is 
allowed while the wholesale price is constrained to be no lower than unit cost, the rival retail price 
would be set below the multi-product monopoly level. If retail prices are strategic substitutes, 
moreover, in the sense that a higher price for one good leads retailers to charge a lower price 
for the other good, the (maintained) retail price on the monopoly good would also be set below 
the monopoly level to induce a higher retail price on the fringe good. Similarly, a proscription 
against retail predation (loss leadership) would prevent the monopolist from raising her wholesale 
price above the (maintained) retail price. Such regulation would result in a wholesale price set 
equal to the retail price, prompting retailers to set the retail price of the fringe good below the 
multi-product monopoly level. In both cases, antitrust regulations that prohibit below-cost pricing 
are pro-competitive and lead to a reduction in both retail prices. 
Antitrust law also limits vertical restraints directly (Comanor and Rey, 1997). Is a ﬂexible 
antitrust approach to vertical restraints, as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Leegan Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (Slip Op. no. 06–480, 2007), in the public interest? In 
our analysis, the vertical restraint enables contracting parties to support the integrated monopoly 
outcome. Nevertheless, the welfare implications of the practice depend upon the baseline selected 
for comparison. If no contracts are allowed at all, so that all products are supplied by wholesale 
pricing, double-marginalization of the monopoly good results in a retail price that is higher 
than the monopoly level. Vertical contracts can have favorable welfare properties in this case. 
If two-part contracts are allowed, then our analysis indicates that also allowing for minimum 
RPM provisions reduces welfare; however, maximum RPM can produce pro-competitive effects 
even when the design of the vertical restraint is to achieve horizontal control of the marketplace. 
Broadly speaking, this logic supports a ﬂexible “rule of reason” for judging the legality of vertical 
restraints, but also argues for careful scrutiny of the impact of vertical restraints on cross-market 
competition in multi-product retail environments. 
Appendix 
� Proof of Proposition 1. Properties (i) and (ii) follow from equation (11). For equilibrium retail proﬁt per customer, 
we turn to the ﬁrst-order condition for a retailer’s choice of p2: 
1 1∗ 2∗ 1 1∗ 2∗ 1∗ 2∗ 2F1(w , c
2) = −�( p , p ; w , c2)y2( p , p ) − t(w 1 − c1)∂ y1( p , p )/∂ p = 0 
⇒ �() = −t(w 1 − c1)(∂ y1()/∂ p2)/y2 . (A1) 
The claimed signs follow from (A1) and properties (i) and (ii). Q.E.D. 
30 The related practice of charging slotting allowances to suppliers has drawn recent regulatory attention in the 
United States (Federal Trade Commission, 2003), although no explicit linkage has been made to the use of vertical 
restraints. 
� � � � 
Proof of Corollary 1. Substituting (6) into (5) (evaluated at (p1∗ , p2∗)) gives 
∂π1/∂π1 = (2y2)−1{(w 1 − c1)A1 − (w 2 − c2)A2}, 
i i iwhere Ai ≡ y (∂ y ()/∂ pj) − yj (∂ y ()/∂ pi), j =� i, and  Ai > 0 for  i ∈ {1,2} by our initial assumption that | dlnui / 
1 2 2 1 1dlnyi | > | dlnui / dlnyj | for j =� i. Hence, at p = p1∗, with w = c , ∂π  1/∂p < 0 for strong substitutes and ∂π  1/∂p > 0 
otherwise. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Preliminaries. Deﬁne  (p1(w), p2(w)) that solve equations (5) and (6) in the symmetric equilibrium 
(where w = w 1 and w 2 = c2). Further deﬁne the wholesale prices that solve equations (8) and (10), respectively, 
1∗ 2∗ w(8) : p
1(w) = p , w(10) : p2(w) = p , 
where w (8) > c1 (from equation (8)) and w (10) < (>) c1 for strong substitutes (weak substitutes, independent goods, and 
1∗ 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 22∗; ¯ 2)/∂ p = ϕ� ∗ 
complements) (from equation (10)). Note from equation (9), 
p2(w(8)) < p . 
2∗ (A2) 
Similarly, evaluating equation (5) with w 1 = w (10), we have  �� � �  � � � �  �� � � � � �� 
∂π1( p , p u2 , w  , c ∂ϕ/∂  p ∂ y /∂ p − ∂ϕ/∂  p ∂ y /∂ p / ϕ ∂ y /∂ p + y ∂ϕ/∂  p .1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium, 
p1(w(10)) < (>) p
1∗ for strong substitutes (other goods). (A3) 
Constrained to two-part contracts, the monopoly manufacturer’s choice problem is 
max �(p1(w), p2(w); c1 , c2). (A4) 
w 
Assumption. For a relevant range of w, p1(w) and  p2(w) are monotone (A1), and ∂2�/∂ p1∂ p2 = s ∂ y1/∂ p2 at (p1(w), 
p2(w)) by (A2), where ∂2�/∂ p1∂ p2 = 2(∂ y1/∂ p2) + � ( pi − ci )(∂2 yi /∂ p1∂ p2).i=1,2 
Assumption (A1) ensures that the pi(w) functions are well behaved. Assumptions (A2) and (A3) avoid dominance 
of third-order effects and are satisﬁed if third-order derivatives of u are sufﬁciently small relative to second-order 
derivatives. 
By Assumption (A1), we can deﬁne the inverse function, 
w 1( p1) :  p1(w 1( p1)) = p1 , (A5) 
and the good 2 retail price mapping, 
p2(p1) = p2(w 1( p1)). (A6) 
(A5) and (A6) imply the equivalent monopoly choice problem, 
max �(p1 , p2(p1); c1 , c2). (A7) 
p1 
(i) Case of strong substitutes. By (A2) and (A3) and (A5) and (A6), we have the two points on the p2(p1) function, namely 
1∗ 1∗(p , p2( p1∗) = p2(w(8)) < p2∗) and  (p1(w(10)) < p , p2∗). 
Hence, by Assumption (A1), 
dp2( p1)/dp1 < 0. (A8) 
For p1 > p1∗, we have (by  (A5))  p2(p1) < p2(w (8)) < p2∗ and, hence, 
1 
� 
p2(w(8) ) p
1 1 1∗ 1 1∗ 2 2 1 2∗ �(p , p2(p1); c , c2) = �(p , p2(w(8)); c , c2) − ∂�(p , p ; .)/∂ p dp2 + [∂�(p , p ; .)/∂ p1] 
p2( p1) p1∗ � p2∗ � 
1 2 1∗ 1 (A9)− [∂2�(p , p2; .)/∂ p ∂ p1] dp2 dp1 < �(p , p2(w(8)); c , c2). 
p2 
The inequality is due to the deﬁnition of (p1∗ , p2∗), concavity of � (note 6), p2(w (8)) < p2∗, and  [∂2�(p1, 
p2;.)/∂ p2∂ p1] > 0 for strong substitutes (A2). 
� 
� � 
Similarly, for p1 < p1(w (10)) < p1∗, we have (by  (A8))  p2(p1) > p2∗ and, hence, 
� p � p2( p1)1(w(10) ) 
1 1 2∗ 1 1 2∗ 1 1 2∗ �(p , p2( p1); c , c2) = �(p1(w(10)), p ; c , c2) − [∂�( p , p ; .)/∂ p1]d p + [∂�( p , p ; .)/∂ p2] 
p1 p2∗ � p1∗ � 
2 1 2 2 1 2 2∗ 1 (A10)− [∂ �(p , p ; .)/∂ p ∂ p1]d p d p < �( p1(w(10)), p ; c , c2). 
p1 
By (A9) and (A10), any solution to (A7) is a p1 ∈ [ p1(w (10)), p1∗]. 
Differentiating (A7) and evaluating at p1 = p1(w (10)), where p2(p1) = p2∗ , 
1 2 1 2d� p1(w(10)), p
2(p1(w(10))); c , c /d p = [∂�()/∂ p1] + [∂�()/∂ p2][d p /d p1] > 0, (A11) 
1∗ 1 2∗where the inequality follows from: (i) p1(w (10))< p , implying [∂�(p , p ;.)/∂p1] > 0; 
(ii) dp2(p1)/dp1 < 0 by (A8); and (iii) � p1∗ 
2] 1∗ 2∗ 2] − [∂2 1 2∗ 2 1[∂�()/∂ p = [∂�( p , p ; .)/∂ p �(p , p ; .)/∂ p ∂ p1]d p
p1(w(10) ) � p1∗ 
1 2∗ 2 1= −  [∂2�( p , p ; .)/∂ p ∂ p1]d p < 0. 
p1(w(10) ) 
1 1∗ 2∗Finally, differentiating (A7) at p = p , where  p2(p1) = p2(w (8))< p , 
1∗ 1∗ 1 1d�( p , p2(p ); c , c2)/d p < 0, (A12) 
where the inequality follows from (i) � p2∗ 
1∗ 2∗ 1 2 2[∂�()/∂ p1] = [∂�( p , p ; .)/∂ p1] − [∂2�( p , p2; .)/∂ p ∂ p1]d p
p2(w(8) ) � p2∗ 
= −  [∂2�(p1 , p2; .)/∂ p2∂ p1]d p2 < 0; 
p2(w(8) ) 
1 2∗ 1∗(ii) dp2(p1)/dp < 0 by (A8); and (iii) with p2(w (8)) < p , [∂�()/∂p2] = [∂�(p , p2;.)/∂p2] > 0.
 
Together, equations (A8)–(A12) imply that any solution to (A7) is a p1 ∈ (p1(w (10)), p1∗), implying that p2∈(p2(w (8)),
 
2∗ 1 2 2∗ p ); hence, p < p1∗ and p < p . 
(ii) Other cases. It sufﬁces to consider independent goods. By continuity, the same conclusions will apply to 
sufﬁciently weak substitutes and sufﬁciently weak complements. Here we have two points on the p2(p1) schedule: 
1∗ 2∗ 1∗ 2∗(p ,p2(w(8)) < p ) and  (  p
1(w(10)) > p , p ). 
Hence, by Assumption A1, d p2(p1)/dp1 > 0. Following mathematics similar to those in (A9) and (A10), we have, 
1 2 2∗for p > p1(w (10)) (and hence p > p ), 
1 1 2∗ 1�( p , p2(p1); c , c2) < �( p1(w(10)), p ; c , c
2), (A13) 
and, for p1 > p1∗ (and hence, p2(p1) < p2(w (8)) < p2∗), 
1 1 1∗ 1�( p , p2( p1); c , c2) < �( p , p2(w(8)); c , c
2). (A14) 
Finally, differentiating (A7) at p1 = p1∗ (where p2(p1) = p2(w (8)) < p2∗), 
1∗ 1∗ 1 1 2d�( p , p2( p ); c , c2)/d p = [∂�()/∂ p2][d p /d p1] > 0, (A15) 
where the equality is due to [∂�()/∂p1] = 0 at  p1 = p1∗(by the deﬁnition of p1∗ and the assumption of independent goods), 
and the inequality follows from dp2(p1)/dp1 > 0 and, with p2(w (8))< p2∗ (and the assumed concavity in �), [∂�()/ 
1∗ 1 2∗ ∂ p2] = [∂�( p , p2;.)/∂ p2] > 0. Similarly, at p = p1(w (10)), where p2(p1) = p , 
d�( p1(w(10)), p
2( p1(w(10))); c
1 , c2)/d p1 = [∂�()/∂ p1] < 0. (A16) 
1∗ 1∗Together, (A13)–(A16) imply that any solution to (A7) is a p1∈ (p , p1(w (10))> p ), implying that p2 ∈(p2(w (8))< 
2∗ 2∗ 1 2 2∗ p , p ); hence, p > p1∗ and p < p . Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3. First note the following (given Assumption 1): 
 s  s2 1 2 2 2 1∗ 2 1 2Claim 1. ∂ p w , w1 ; p2 /∂ p2 =� p , p1 ; w , w1 ,where “ =” denotes “equals in sign.” 
2 1 2 2Proof of Claim 1. Differentiating the ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) associated with problem (13) at p = p2(w , w1; p2) 
and making use of the second-order condition gives 
s � � � � � �2 2 1∗ 2 2 
2 1 2 2∂ p
2()/∂ p = ∂�()/∂ p [∂φ()/∂ u] ∂u ∗ p , p /∂ p� � � � � � � � s2 1∗ 2 2 1∗ 2 = �() y p , p1 /(2tφ) y p , p2 /(2t) = �(), 
where the terms after the equality are derived by substituting from the FOC and expanding the relevant partial derivatives. 
Claim 1 Q.E.D. 
Claim 2. At  w 2 = c2, F2(w 1(w 2), w 2) > 0 in (14) (where w 1(w 2) solves (16)). 
Proof of Claim 2. First note that, if � = 0 and  w 2 = c2, then (16) implies that w 1 = c1 and, hence, � >  0, a contradiction. 
Therefore, at (w 1,w 2) = (w 1(c2),c2), � �= 0. With � �= 0, Claim 1 implies that the ﬁrst set of right-hand terms in (17) is 
positive; with w 2 = c2, the second set of right-hand terms in (17) is zero. Claim 2 Q.E.D. 
Claim 3. There is a bounded wˆ 2 > c2 such that F2(w 1(wˆ 2), wˆ 2) < 0 in (17).  
Proof of Claim 3. Deﬁne  ˆw 2 by w 1(wˆ 2) = c1; that is, from (16), 
wˆ2 − c2 = �(p1∗ , p2∗ ; c1 , c2){y2(p1∗ , p2∗)/t}/{[y2( p1∗ , p2∗)2/t] − [∂ y2( p1∗ , p2∗)/∂ p2]} > 0. (A17) 
Also from (16), we have 
1∗ 1 2�( p , p2∗ ; c , wˆ2) = s wˆ2 − c > 0. (A18) 
2 2 1Hence, by Claim 1 and Assumption 1, 0 < ∂  p ()/∂ p2 < 1 at (w ,w 
2) = (c1,wˆ 2), which implies (together with 
� >  0 and  wˆ 2 > c2): 
F2(c
1 , wˆ2) < �()y2() + (wˆ 2 − c2)t [∂ y2()/∂ p2] = −(w 1 − c1)t(∂ y1()/∂ p2) = 0, (A19) 
where the ﬁrst inequality evaluates the right-hand side of (17) at ∂p2()/ ∂p2 2 = 1; the ﬁrst equality substitutes from (16); 
and the ﬁnal equality is due to w 1(wˆ 2) = c1. Q.E.D. 
Claim 4 (Proposition 3). There is a w 2∗∈(c2,wˆ 2) such that (w 1,w 2) = (w 1(w 2∗),w 2∗) solve (16) and (17). 
Proof of Claim 4. Follows directly from Claim 2, Claim 3, continuity of F2(w 1(w 2),w 2) in  w 2, and the intermediate value 
theorem (IVT). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4. First note: 
Claim 5. w 1∗ is above or below c1, depending upon whether � ∗∗ is positive or negative, and whether the two goods are 
1∗ 2 2complements (∂y1(p , p2∗)/∂p < 0) or substitutes (∂y1()/∂p > 0) as follows: 
Retail Goods Are 
Complements Substitutes 
� ∗∗ 1∗ 1 1∗ 1> 0 w > c w < c
� ∗∗ 1∗ 1 1∗ 1< 0 w < c w > c
Proof of Claim 5. Substitute (16) into (17), giving us the following necessary condition for (w 1∗ , w 2∗) to support the 
integrated optimum: � � � � ��  � �
1∗ 2 2 1∗ 2 1∗(w 1 − c1)(∂ y1( p , p2∗)/∂ p2) ∂ p2()/∂ p2 = (w 2 − c2) 1 − (∂ p2()/∂ p2) ∂ y2( p , p2∗)/∂ p − (y2( p , p2∗)/t) . 
(A20) 
By Assumption 1 (∂ p2()/∂ p22 < 1) and Proposition 3 (w 
2∗ > c2), the term on the right-hand side of (A20) is 
negative at the optimum. Hence, the term on the left-hand side of (A20) must be negative. Making use of Claim 1, this 
requirement yields Claim 5. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4(i) follows from Proposition 1 (� >  0 at  w 2 = c2), d�(.;w 1(w 2),w 2)/dw 2 > 0 (by  δ >  0 for  
2∗ 1∗complements), and w >c2 (Proposition 3), which together imply � ∗∗ >0 and hence (by Claim 5), w > c1. For part (ii), 
note: 
Claim 6. If the goods are weak (strong) substitutes, �(p1∗ , p2∗; w 1(c2), c2) < (>) 0.  
1 1 1 1 1Proof of Claim 6. At (w , w 2) = (c , c2), �(.;c , c2) > 0 and  F1(c , c2)<0 (from (16)); moreover, ∂F1(w , c2)/∂w1 = δ >  
1 1 1(<) 0 (for weak [strong] substitutes); hence, F1(w , c2)<0 for all w ≤ (≥) c and, in order to satisfy (16), w 1(c2) > 
(<) c1. With [∂y1()/∂p2] >0 (substitutes) and w 1>(<)c1, satisfaction of (16) requires that �(.;w 1(c2), c2) be negative 
(positive). Q.E.D. 
From (A18), we have that �(.;w 1(wˆ 2), wˆ 2) >0 for  wˆ 2 > c2. With �(.;w 1(c2), c2)<0 (Claim 6 for weak substitutes) 
2)> 2+ ∈ (c2 2+), ˆ 1(wand �(.;w 1(wˆ 2), wˆ 0, there is a wˆ , wˆ2) :  �(.; w 1(wˆ w 2+) = 0 (by continuity of �(.;w 2), w 2) in  
�� � � 
� � 
� � � 
2 2 2 2+ w and the IVT). Moreover, at w = wˆ2+, F2(w 1(w 2), w 2)<0 (because �() = 0 and  w = wˆ > c2); hence, given 
Claim 2, continuity of F2(w 1(w 2),w 2) in  w 2, and  the IVT,  w 2∗∈(c2, wˆ 2+) and  w 1∗ = w 1(w 2∗) solve (16) and (17). With 
�(.;w 1(wˆ 2+), wˆ 2+) = 0, w 2∗ < wˆ2+, and  d�(.;w 1(w 2), w 2)/dw 2>0 (by  δ >  0 for weak substitutes), we have � ∗∗ <0 and  
hence (by Claim 5), w 1∗ > c1. 
For part (iii), � ∗∗= �(.;w 1(w 2∗),w 2∗)>0 follows from: (a) �(.;w 1(c2),c2) > 0 (Claim 6 for strong substitutes); (b) 
�(.;w 1(wˆ 2), wˆ 2) > 0 (from (A17) and (A18)); (c) w 2∗∈(c2, wˆ 2) (Claim 4 of Proposition 3); and (d) d�(.;w 1(w 2),w 2)/dw 2≤ 
0 (by  δ ≤ 0 for strong substitutes). Hence, w 1∗ < c1 follows from Claim 5. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Corollary 3. The corollary follows directly from Propositions 2 and 3, and equation (18). 
Proof of Proposition 5. With wˆ2 as deﬁned in (19), observe that F2(c1,wˆ 2) < 0 (Claim 3). Now consider w 1< c1. 
Substituting for ( wˆ 2 − c2)γ in F2 of equation (17), 
1 2 2 1∗ 2∗ 1 2F2(w , wˆ
2) = ∂ p /∂ p2 �( p , p ; w , c2) − � ∗ y . (A21) 
Deﬁne ω = −w 1 and expand the ﬁrst right-hand term in (A21): 
∂ p2/∂ p2
2 �( p1∗ ; p2∗ ; w 1 , c2) = A(ω)/B(ω), (A22) 
where A(ω) = (y2)2 �(.;−ω = w 1, w 2) �(.; −ω = w 1, c2), and 
1 2 2 2 i2)2 2) + i − w 2)2)B(ω) = �(.; −ω = w , w  2)[2(y + t(∂ y /∂ p2)] − t2 2(∂ y /∂ p (p i )(∂ y /∂( p , 
i=1,2 
all evaluated at (p1∗ , p2∗, wˆ 2). Taking derivatives: 
1 1 1∂A/∂ω = (y2)2[�(.; −ω = w , w  2) + �(.; −ω = w , c2)]y > 0, (A23) 
2)2∂B/∂ω = y1[2(y + t(∂ y2/∂ p2)] + t2[∂2 y1/∂( p2)2] = z, (A24) 
where the inequality in (A23) follows from �(.; −ω = w 1, c2) > 0 (with w 1 ≤ c1 and � ∗ > 0) and �(.; −ω = w 1, w 2) 
2 2 2> 0 (from equation (16), w = wˆ > c2 (equation (16�)), w 1≤ c1, (∂y2/∂p2) < 0, and with δ = 0, ∂y1/∂p > 0). Note that 
∂B/∂ω  in (A24) is a constant (invariant to ω) z.  
Claim 7. There  is  a  w 1∗ ∈ (−∞,c1): F2(w 1∗, wˆ 2) > 0. 
Proof of Claim 7. Deﬁne  ω0 = −c1. There are three cases: (i) z < 0. Let �≡ −B(ω0)/z > 0, where the inequality is due to 
B(ω0) > 0 (by second-order conditions for the retailer’s choice of p2) and  z  < 0. Consider ω1 = ω0 +�. By construction, 
B(ω1) = 0 and  B(ω) > 0 for  ω∈(ω0, ω1). Hence, limω→ω1 (A/B) = ∞, and by continuity, there is an ω ∗∈(ω0, ω1): (A/B)> 
� ∗. (ii) z = 0. With limω→∞ A(ω) = ∞  and B(ω) = B(ω0)>0, there is an ω ∗∈(ω0, ∞): (A/B)> �  ∗. (iii) z>0. Now we 
have limω→∞ A(ω) = limω→∞ B(ω) = ∞. By L’Hopital’s rule, limω→∞ [A(ω)/B(ω)] = limω→∞ [∂A/∂ω]/z = ∞. Hence, 
for all cases, there is an ω ∗∈(ω0, ∞): (A/B)> �  ∗. The claim now follows from the deﬁnition of ω and equations (A21) 
and (A22). Q.E.D. 
The proposition follows directly from Claims 3 and 7 and the IVT. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6. The claimed equilibrium properties of w and � ∗∗∗follow directly from equations (24) and (25). 
1A+/∂p1BBy second-order conditions and our premise that ∂p < 1 (note 27), we have (recalling notes 26 and 27), 
1∗∗ 1A 1B 1A)� ∗∗ 1B 2)� ∗∗d p /dw = s ∂ p + ∂w  =s (∂ y /∂ p − (∂ y /∂ p (A25)2,2 1 A,2, 
2∗∗ 2 2 1∗∗d p /dw = (∂ p + /∂w) + (∂ p + /∂ p1B)(d p /dw), (A26) 
where 
2 1A 2)� ∗∗ 1B 1A)� ∗∗ ∂ p + /∂w = s (∂ y /∂ p − (∂ y /∂ p (A27)1A,1A 1A,2 
2 1B) 1A,2� 
∗∗ 
1B,2� 
∗∗ = � ∗∗ − � ∗∗(∂ p + /∂ p s 1A,1B 1 A,1A . (A28) 
For independent goods (∂y1i/∂p2 = 0, i ∈ {A,B}), the right-hand side of (A25) is negative (with ∂y1B/∂p2 = 0, ∂y1B/ 
1A 1B/∂p2∂p > 0, and � ∗∗ 2,2 < 0 by second-order conditions) and the right-hand side of (A26) equals zero (with ∂y = 0, 
� ∗∗ 1∗∗(w) < p1∗∗(c) = 2∗∗(w)< p2∗∗(c) =and � ∗∗ = = 0); hence, with w >  c in equilibrium, p p1∗ and p p2∗. For other 1A,2 1B,2 
cases, we assume that the conditions described in note 26 are satisﬁed, so that dp1∗∗(w)/dw <  0. In addition, we assume 
j =that � ∗∗ i, j = 
s 
∂ yi /∂ p = 0 for  j � i, which will be true if third-order derivatives of u are sufﬁciently small. Hence, appealing 
to second-order conditions, dp2∗∗(w)/dw <  0 for substitutes and dp2∗∗(w)/dw>0 for complements. It follows for strong 
1∗∗(w) > p1∗∗(c) = p1∗ 2∗∗(w) > p2∗∗(c) = p 1∗∗(w) <substitutes that w <  c, p and p 2∗; for weak substitutes that w >  c, p
1∗∗(c) = 2∗∗(w) < p2∗∗(c) = 1∗∗(w) < p1∗∗(c) = 2∗∗(w) > p2∗∗(c)p p1∗ and p p2∗; and for complements that w >  c, p p1∗ and p
= p2∗ . Q.E.D. 
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